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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last three decades, Taiwan's economy has entered 
a transition that economic planners hope will bring it to join 
the ranks of developed countries by the end of this decade. 
According to the 10-year economic plan released in March, 1980 
by the Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan 
expects that the gross national product(GNP) will grow from 
US$ 40 billion to US$ 130 billion and exports from US$ 20 
billion to US$ 100 billion. Per capita GNP in 1989 is targeted 
at US$ 6,100, compared with US$ 2,200 in 198 ol 
Judging by its performance in the postwar period, Taiwan 
has a good chance of making a successful transition to a 
developed market economy. Being a small island, it has an 
area of less than 14»000 square miles  about the combined 
size of the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode 
Island. The island is also densely populated  around 1,230 
person per square miles, one of the highest in the world. In 
terms of natural resources, Taiwan, like most de.veloping 
countries, only has the minimum amount of resources, required 
1 
Andrew Tanzer, "Taiwan Aims to Join the Economic 
Elite," Far Eastern Economic Review(May 22, 1981), p.45. 
1 
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for economic development. Coal is its most important mineral 
resource with an estimated reserve at about 250 million metric 
tons, but the veins are thin and irregular and quality is in¬ 
ferior, while the costs of mining are high. 
Beside coal, other minerals are very- limited. But there 
are reserves of marble stone, natural gas, gold, copper, 
sulphur, pyrite and oil. Another aspect of Taiwan's resource 
endowment is its agricultural land. However, only one-fourth 
of total land area is arable and quality is limited after 
centuries of continuous intensive use. But, its subtropical 
climate allows the growing to be extended and for the culti¬ 
vation of several crops a year. With these two chief agri¬ 
cultural advantages, Taiwan has always assured self-sufficiency 
2 
in basic agricultural commodities. 
If successful economic development depends on the amount 
of natural resources, the prospects of Taiwan are poor. 
Fortunately, natural resources are not the only element for 
economic development, since trade, capital, labor and etc. 
can substitute- for them. Hence, Taiwan has to import many 
agricultural and industrial raw materials., as well as ma¬ 
chinery and equipment, which all requires the expenditure 
of foreign exchange that has to be earned through exports. 
Moreover, the domestic market of Taiwan is extremely small 
2 
K. T. Li, The Experience of Dynamic Economic Growth 
on Taiwan(Taipei : Mei Ya Publication, Inc., 1 976), p.35-37. 
3 
and does not provide enough inducement to take advantage of 
economies of scale associated with the development of capital- 
intensive and sophisticated industries. However, the expansion 
of exports helps offset these shortcoming. Indeed, the sig¬ 
nificance of export expansion to economic development has long 
been acknowledged since the coming of mercantilism in the 17th 
century, particularity the fact that export expansion can help 
3 
enlarge markets'. Therefore, to the government, export promotion 
has been an established policy in Taiwan. 
As a result of concerted efforts, exports have contri¬ 
buted to a spectacular increase in industrial production, 
employment, and growth of national income. From 1952 to 1980, 
its real GNP increased eleven times the real GNP of 1952 and 
rose to NT$ 1,003 billion(US$ 27.8 billion); the average 
annual growth rate was 9.0 percent. As another indicator for 
measuring economic growth, real per capita GNP, more than 
quintupled. Exports, a major component of Taiwan's economic 
growth, increased 485-fold at average annual growth rate of 
24.7 percent over a period of 28 years, as is shown in Table 1. 
Vast structural change in the Taiwanese economy have 
also taken place in the course of its rapid development. 
Take the composition of income for instance. Agriculture's 
share has been gradually falling from 35.7 percent to 9.1 
percent since 1952, whereas industry's share overtook agri¬ 
culture's and rose to 45.7 percent in 1980. In fact, in view 
^Ibid. , p .20. 
4 
TABLE 1 
SELECTED INDICATORS OF TAIWAN ECONOMY, 1952-1980 
A. Index of 1 980 (1 976 = 100) Index Annual Growth 
Economic Growth (NT$ million) (1 952=1 00) Rate (%) 
1 . Real GNP 1,003,599 1,116 9.0 
2. Real Per Capita 
GNP (NT$) 56,588 540 6.2 
3. Agricultural 
Output 91,327 286 3.8 
4. Industrial 
Output 458,644 4,107 1 4.2 
5. Transp. & 
Communi. 64,230 4,676 14.7 
6. Exports 537,929 48,514 24.7 
7. Imports 566,029 28,086 22.3 
B. Index of Economic 1 952 1 980 
Modernization (%) (%) 
1. Composition of Employment 
Agriculture 61 .0 28.3 
Industry 9.3 31.4 
Commerce 8.5 11 .4 
Other 21 .2 28.9 
2. Composition of Income 
Agriculture 35.7 9.1 
Industry 17.9 45.7 
Commerce 18.7 14.4 
Other 27.7 30.8 
3. Composition of Exports 
Agricultural Products 22.1 3.6 
Processed Agricultural Products 69.8 5.6 
Industrial Products 8.1 90.8 
4. Composition of Imports 
Capital Goods 1 4.2 23.4 
Agricultural & Industrial 
Raw Materials 65.9 70.8 
Comsumption Goods 1 9.9 5.8 
Sourc.e: R.O.C. Council for Economic Planning and Development 
Taiwan Statistical Data Book. Taipei, 1982. 
5 
of the composition of exports, it shows that Taiwan's economy 
has been transformed from predominantly agricultural economy 
to one in which industry is gaining rapidly in importance. 
Many economists believe that the further transition from 
labor-intensive to capital- and technology-intensive industries 
that took root in the second half of 1970s will soon blossom 
in near future. 
In the immediate postwar years, the initial condition 
of Taiwan's economy was not so much different from many other 
less developed countries. But, within a short period, Taiwan 
changed its economy from that of unstable agricultural pro¬ 
ducer to a rapidly expanding exporter of light manufactures 
and other lightly processed goods. It is now on the threshold 
of moving from the ranks of a middle income developing country 
to reach Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) status^ Many other developing countries are still beset 
by the economic ills of industrial inefficiency, persistent 
price inflation and unfavorable balance of payment. Thus, 
it is believed that the experience of Taiwan is very important 
to other developing countries. And, it will be meaningful to 
study the structure of foreign trade, a key sector of Taiwan's 
economy. The outline of this case study is organized as follows. 
To appreciate the historical background for better 
4 Free China Weekly, May 16» 1982. 
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understanding the foreign trade and its development, chapter 
1 reviews the pattern of trade and economic development of 
Taiwan over the past three decades. Chapter 2 describes the 
trade policy of Taiwanese economy and emphasizes its role 
in industrial development. 
Chapter 3 is an analysis of the composition of foreign 
trade, which include aggregate performance of trade, balance 
of payments, trade commodity pattern, and concentration 
pattern of trade. Since U.S. aid has provided decisive as¬ 
sistance to the island’s industrialization and trade develop¬ 
ment, this chapter also seeks to describe and examine it and 
foreign investment. Chapter 4 attempts to discuss the relation 
of trade and national product, and the contribution of trade 
to economic growth. In a conclusion, a sketch is drawn showing 
some lesson from the past experience and some prospects of 
Taiwanese economy in the future. 
The year 1949 has been selected as the beginning year 
of this study, as this was the year that the Chinese govern¬ 
ment retreated to Taiwan and took measures to propel economic 
development. However, mos..t statistical data take 1 952 as the 
base year for comparison, since it was not until 1952 that 
whole economic condition returned to normalcy after World 
War II. The study terminates with the year 1980, as the most 
recent period for which a large quantity of statistical data 
is available. 
CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND ON FOREIGN TRADE 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Choosing a suitable development strategy is very im¬ 
portant for an economy like Taiwan, which has a limited en¬ 
dowment of natural resources and the highest population 
density to arable land of any country in the world. Because 
it adopted an outward-looking development strategy based on 
export expansion, the island has been well off. 
The purpose of this chapter is to take a general look 
at trade and development to see how the former was effectively 
used to promote the Taiwan's postwar economy. 
1 . 1 The Immediate Postwar Years, 1 945-1 950 
At the end of World War II, in 1945, Taiwan was returned 
to Chinese control. As a result of the war, its economy laid 
in ruins. Allied bombings caused industrial plant and infra¬ 
structure significantly reduced production capacity. In the 
prewar years, Taiwan was a colony of Japan. The Japanese 
monopolized Taiwan's industrial production, particularly in 
7 
8 
technology and management. So, with the departure of the 
Japanese, the gap could not be filled quickly, and the economy 
experienced chaotic circumstance. In the meantime, the central 
Chinese government was preoccupied with its strug-gle against 
the communists and could not provide any assistance to the 
island. Therefore, Taiwan proceded aimlessly for several years 
until 1949 when the government retreated from the mainland 
China. Industrial and agricultural production in 1946 was below 
one-half the peak reached in the colonial period and did not 
attain full recovery until 1952 (see Table 1.1). 
From 1948 to 1950, more than one million civilians, 
in addition to members of the armed forces, arrived in Taiwan. 
Although the influx of migrations filled the human resource 
vacuum left by the repatriation of Japanese manpower, this 
sudden increase in population intensified postwar dislocation. 
Moreover, the inflationary trend had existed since the last 
war years, and was aggravated by the" heavy financial deficits. 
In 1945-48, prices rose about tenfold each year, and acceler¬ 
ated in 1949. Over the same period, the trade had fallen very 
much. By 1948, the exports and imports had recovered to only 
2 
a quarter or less of their prewar volume. 
1 
Cho-Jung Wang, How Did We Make a Miracle Economy?( 
Taipei, 1 978), p.9. 
2 
Maurice Scott, " Foreign Trade,'! in Economic Growth 
and Structure Change in Taiwan,ed., Walter Galenson (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1978), p.313. 
9 
TABLE 1.1 
MAJOR PRODUCTS OF INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE IN COLONIAL 
AND POSTWAR PERIOD 
Products Units Colonial 1946 
■ Period 
1 949 1 952 1 976 
Rice 1 , 000 mt 1 ,402 894 1 ,215 1 ,570 2,713 
Sugar 1 , 000 mt 1,374 86 647 528 779 
Fisheries 1 , 000 mt 1 20 51 80. 1 22 81 0 




kwh 1 ,1 95 472 854 1,420 26,877 
Coal 1 , 000 mt 2,854 1,049 1 ,614 2,286 3,236 
Cotton 
Yarn mt 539 41 0 1 , 805 .13,576 147,477 
Cotton 
Fabrics 1 ,000 m 2,682 2,558 29,805 87,63-9 811 ,233 
Paper 1 , 000 t 26 3 1 0 28 31 9 
Fertilizerl,000 mt 34 5 46' 1 30 1 ,51 8 
Cement 1 , 000 mt 303 97 291 446 8,757 
Steel Bar 1 , 000 mt 1 8 3 11 1 8 1 ,603 
General 
Machinery t 8,200 980 3,666 6,1 55 317,741 
** Highest production in colonial.period. 
* mt : Metric ton. m: meter. 
t: ton. kwh: kilowatthour. 
Source: Cho-Jung Wang, How Did We Make a Miracle Economy? 
(Taipei, 1 978), p.9. 
To meet these formidable challenges, the government in 
1949 began to take measures to adjust the economic situation. 
First, a land reform was undertaken, since at that time agri¬ 
culture was the largest and strongest sector in the economy. 
For obvious reasons, Taiwan decided to rely upon its agricul¬ 
tural sector to feed and clothe the enlarged population and 
to supply the labor, capital, and goods for economic develop¬ 
ment. Then, a currency reform was introduced in June 1949 to 
bring down rampant inflation. But, by 1945-51, the rate of 
inflation was still out of control. The consumer price index 
rose about 500 percent between 1 949-50, and about 160 to 200 
3 
percent between 1950-51. In fact, no very effective measures 
were taken to deal with the inflation until 1951. 
1.2 Primary Import Substitution, 1 951 -1 957 
In response to inflation and balance-of-payments crisis, 
a package of import controls were put into force in 1951. The 
crises bascially resulted from the deficit financing for re¬ 
construction, massive military expenditures, and a growing 
trade deficit. Thus, the government imposed strict controls 
on foreign exchange and imports. This led to the adoption of 
an import substitution policy to shift its economy from agri¬ 
culture to industry. 
Erik Lundberg, "Fiscal and Monetary Policies," in 
Economic Growth and Structure Change in Taiwan, ed., Walter 
Galenson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p.p.266. 
11 
High protective measures were imposed on many imports; 
for example, import licensing were severely applied and im¬ 
porters were required to make advance payments for imports 
equivalent to the full value for most items. Furthermore, the 
rates of exchange applicable to some imports were higher than 
those applicable to exports; in a sense, it was a substantial 
import tax. In addition, loans were made on favorable terms 
and import material was directly allocated to factories. All 
these measures undoubtedly gave a strong inducement to import 
substitution. 
As is typical for developing countries, Taiwan focused 
its industries on such nondurable consumer goods as textile, 
plastics, artificial fibre, glass, leather product, plywood, 
and apparel. Between 1952 to 1957, industrial: output had 
doubled to an average rate of growth 12.7 percent per annum, 
while the real gross domestic product grew only 7.1 percent 
annually. Over the same period, the share of consumer goods 
in total imports fell from 19.9 to 6.9 percent^ According to 
one estimate, owing to the implementation of import substitu¬ 
tion policy incentives, by 1954 the exports of nonfood manu¬ 
factures was only about 2 percent of nonfood manufacturing 
production , while the domestic production could supply about 
5 
77 percent of apparent domestic consumption. 
^R.O.C. Council for Economic Planning and Development, 
Taiwan Statistical Data Book (Taipei, 1 982), p. 1 91 . 
5 
Ching-Yuang Lin, Industrialization in Taiwan, 1946-1972 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p.63. 
12 
Nevertheless, as the domestic market for consumer goods 
became saturated in the late years of this phase, the growth 
of output was decelerating, particular in several light-manu¬ 
facturing subsectors such as textile, wood products, and rubber 
goods. From 1953 to 1958, on the basis of three year average 
the annual growth rate of output in nonfood manufacturing 
6 
subsectors were 22, 23, 19» 11» 10 and 10 percent respectively. 
At the same time, the growth of output in intermediate- and 
capital-intensive industries had not picked up because of the 
narrowness of domestic market and the sophisticated nature 
of production technology required. 
Thus, for stabilization and development of economy, 
Taiwan began a shift toward export substitution; that is, to 
increase the relative concentration on the manufacture of 
non-durable consumer goods, but directed these to the inter¬ 
national market. 
1 .3 The Transition to Export Substitution, 1 958-1 962 
By 1958, Taiwan's economy faced a transition. To facili¬ 
tate and speed up this change, the authorities announced a 
major reform on foreign exchange and trade. In the main, this 
reform made three important changes. These included dismantling 




removing the strict controls on imports and foreign exchange 
allocation, and strengthening the policy incentives given to 
7 
export activity. The foreign exchange and trade reform initi¬ 
ated in April 1958 and spread out over the next two years, 
had direct and very remarkable effects on economic development 
in the following twenty years. 
To accelerate the development program, the second main 
set of measures, the 19-point reform program, was adopted by 
the government in Feburary 1960. Although this reform program 
included every major aspect of economic, fiscial, monetary, 
and trade policies, special emphasis was placed on improving 
the investment climate, liberalizing the administrative 
control on industry and trade, and further promoting export 
g 
activity. 
In September I960, the statute for encouragement of 
investment was promulgated, which was pursant to the 19-point 
reform program. The purpose of this statute was to promote 
the acquisition of plant sites and to provide production in¬ 
centives through tax exemptions and deduction!. Actually, 
there were some incentives for investment in the 1950s through 
7 
Chung-Jung Yin, My View on the Economy of Taiwan ( Taipei, 
1 963 ) » vol.2, p.130. 
g 
Wen-Tien Tu, "Industrialization and Protection Policies," 
in Collection of Economic Essay of Industrial Development in 
Taiwan, ed., Wen-Tien Wu (Taipei, 1975), p.66. 
U 
the preferential allocation of foreign exchange, the avail¬ 
ability of U.S. aid and some protections on tariff* But, with 
a limited domestic market and adverse investment climate, 
these policy did not bring much inflows of foreign capital. 
Thus, in the 1960s great stress was laid on the system of tax 
credits. At the beginning, the law was enacted as a temporary 
measure for ten years, then was extented for ten more years, 
and now was revised for promoting the capital- and technology¬ 
intensive industries. 
Comparatively, the first two sets of measures acted 
passively to eliminate and correct the obstacles and diffi¬ 
culties on exports and investment, while the third one active¬ 
ly promoted and established an appropriate environment for 
economic development? These 1958-60 reforms have successfully 
permitted the economy to shift from an essential agricultural- 
based to an light industrial-based pattern of production and 
exports. 
1 .4 Primary Export Substitution, 1 963-1 972 
The adjustments at the end of 1950s and early 1960s 
followed the government's slogan of "Developing agriculture 
9 Kuo, Ranis, and Fei, The Taiwan Success Story: Rapid 
Growth with Improved Distribution in the Republic of China, 
1 952-*1 979 ( Colorado : West View Press, Inc., 1981), p.73 
1 0 
Cho-Jung Wang, How Did We Make a Miracle Economy? 
(Taipei, 1978), p.62. 
by virture of industry, and fostering industry by virture 
of foreign trade". As a whole, there were no new main policies 
in this phase, but some incentive methods affecting trade 
and industry were still taken. For liberalization of import 
controls, the tariff system was revised several time throughout 
this period; import restrictions were loosened in favor of 
export activity. With respect to export promotion, there were cheap 
loans for exporters, plans directed towards the private sector, 
and other miscellaneous measures. For the purpose of attracting 
more domestic and overseas investment capital to accelerate 
economic development , create more job opportunities and en¬ 
large foreign exchange earnings, export processing zones were 
set up in December 1966. Their establishments is patterned 
after free trade zone, but also combined a place of industrial 
estates and the relevant administrative offices of the govern¬ 
ment for the shke of greater simplification and convenience 
. . .11 to investors. 
Generally, the policies coming after the late 1950s and 
1960s have led to the rapid expansion of exports in Taiwan. 
The decade 1963-72 was characterized by the tremendous growth 
of the economy, and was regarded as a golden age in Taiwan's 
postwar economic development. Table 1.2 shows some indicators 
of the island's economy in three different phases. Except for 
agricultural production and transportation and communication, 
11 
Mou-Huan Hsing, "Industrial Development and Trade 
Policy," in Collection of Economic Essay of Foreign Trade in 
Chen Sun (Taipei, 1975), p.151-154. Taiwan, ed., 
TABLE 1 .2 


























1953-62 7.5 4.1 4.8 11.7 1 0.4 8.7 7.6 1 9.5 1 7.0 
1963-72 1 0.8 8.1 4.0 1 8.6 15.7 2.9 1 .8 29.9 23.5 
1973-80 8.7 6.6 2.4 11.9 1 9.0 12.4 12.0 25.0 27.7 
Source: R.O.C. Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book (Taipei, 1982), p.2. 
the average growth rate of most sector in 1963-72 are higher 
than the other two period's. The contribution of e.xport ex¬ 
pansion to industrialization can also be seen in Table 1.3, 
which gives the ratios of exports to major manufacturing pro¬ 
duction. This provides evidence of the fact that the growth 
of many industries in Taiwan has been made possible because 
of overseas markets. 
1.5 Movements Toward 2nd Import and Export Substitution, 
1 973-1 980 
The Taiwanese economy bloosmed remarkably well during 
the 1960s and up to the early 1970s, but was reversed by the 
world recession and rising oil price between 1973-75. To this 
small trade-oriented economy, these shocks were drastic. In¬ 
flation boomed from the late half of 1973 and reached its 
highest level since the early 1950s. The growth of gross na¬ 
tional product, and industrial production dropped to 0.6 and 
-1.5 percent respectively in 1974, while exports fell by -5.7 
percent in 197^? 
However, under the government's economic stabilization 
undertaken in January 1974, the reaction to world recession 
was suprisingly resilient. This revival program contained a 
restrictive monetary policy, a more restricted budget, and 
allowed the controlled price of petroleum products and other 
public sector goods to adjust to costs. After two years of 
1 2 
R.O.C. Council for Economic Planning and Development, 
Taiwan Statistical Data Book(Taipei, 1 982), p.2. 
TABLE 1.3 
EXPORTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF PRODUCTION, BY INDUSTRY 
1 961 1 966 1 969 
Food 20.8 24.7 23.6 
Textile and apparel 1 9.6 25.6 38.9 
Wood products and furniture 22.7 44.7 49.5 
Paper and pulp 5.7 12.7 7.1 
Leather and leather products 2.3 16.9 35.2 
Rubber products 16.9 20.8 36.9 
Chemical fertilizers 4.7 5.5 8.9 
Pharmaceuticals 3.1 3.1 7.6 
Plastic and plastic products 12.0 26.9 44.2 
Other chemicals 14.7 8.3 5.6 
Petroleum products 5.0 4.4 11.5 
Nonmetallic mineral products 8.7 1 9.4 1 4.6 
Products of iron and steel 1 0.6 16.1 16.4 
Aluminum and aluminum products 11.9 1 4.1 1 8.4 
Other metals and metal products 5.3 33.7 24.5 
Machinery 3.4 15.4 27.8 
Electrical machinery, and 
appliances 1 0.2 1 9.5 36.3 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
products 4.8 15.4 34.2 
Transport equipment 0.7 7.1 1 0.1 
Source: Samuel P.S. Ho, Economic Development of Taiwan 
1860-1970(New York: Vail-Ballou Press, 1978), P-1 91 -1 92. 
1 9 
relative stagnation, the economy began to pick up in the 
second half of 1975. The growth rate of GNP amounted to 11.5 
percent, and that of exports rose strongly to about 54 percent 
Although the economy revived quickly in the face of 
recession, it does not mean that these high growth rates can 
be maintained in the future. Because, apart from the rising 
competition coming from other developing countreis, a labor 
shortage has been growing since the late of 1960s, and has 
caused real wage increases in manufacturing. To maintain an 
adequate comparative advantage, the government decided to move 
toward domestic intermediate and capital-intensive goods, es¬ 
pecially relative technology-intensity. Through education and 
training in the past years, Taiwan today has developed and 
accumulated a large pool of highly trained but cheap engineer¬ 
ing manpower to some extent. Hence, it has decided to move into 
high technology areas, which requires large investments, but 
U 
also yield high profits. 
In December 1973» the ten major development projects were 
launched, with seven out of ten big basic construction for fur¬ 
ther restructing and modernizing the economy. These were 
^Ibid., p.2 
14 - 
^"Geoffrey Murray, The Christian Science Monitor 
June 30, 1982. 
20 
the North-South Freeway, Taichung harbor, Northbend Rail¬ 
road, railroad electrification, Taoyuan international air¬ 
port, Suao harbor, an integrated steel mill, Kaohsing ship¬ 
yard, development of the petrochemical industry, and a nuclear 
power plant. In support of advanced import and export sub¬ 
stitution, the term of economic planning was swtiched from 
4 years to 6 years. One of the main features of the first 
Six-year Economic Plan in 1976 is the emphasis given to the 
need to increase capital- and technology-intensity for seeking 
1 5 out new and more sophisticated export products. 
Now Taiwan is hoping to be transformed from a supplier 
of textiles and shoes to one of computer software and a leader 
in science like biotechnology. This is the island's third 
stage of postwar economic development. 
During the past decades, the prime mover behind the 
Taiwan's economic growth has been the broad expansion of ex¬ 
ports, which also brought about the improvement of industrial 
efficiency, inflow of foreign capital, betterment of external 
trade balance, aggregate savings, and enchancement of monetary 
stability. It is believed that for rapid and healthy growth of 
the economy, this pattern of development must and will continue 
in the years lying ahead. 
1 5 K.T. Li, The Experience of Dynamic Economic Growth on 
Taiwan(Taipei : Mei Ya Publication, Inc., 1 976), p.1 68-1 73. 
CHAPTER II 
TRADE POLICY IN TAIWAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 
International trade has often played a crucial role 
in the historical development of the Third World. By opening 
their economies to world trade and commerce, Third World 
countries demanded not only the transfer of goods, services 
and financial resources, but also the transfer of production 
technologies, consumption patterns, even social systems and 
life styles of the rest of the world. However, the features 
of the current world economy have undergone profound changes 
during the twentieth century. For most countries, the perfect 
free-market economy does not exist. Today, the pace and pat¬ 
tern of economic development are influenced by political and 
social as well as economic forces. Clearly, to accelerate 
economic development, a favorable development strategy must 
be fostered as a prerequiste. For developing countries, a 
major component of such strategies focuses on trade policy. 
Generally speaking, trade policies in the development 
process of Taiwan can be divided into two strategies. One is 
1 
'Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third 
World(New York: Longman Inc., 1977), p.270. 
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import substitution, which was adopted during most of the 
1950s, the other is export substitution, which was carried 
out at the end of 1950s and throughout 1960s and 1970s. In 
succeeding sections, major trade policies for promoting and 
guiding the activities of Taiwan's economy in two different 
stages are surveyed and summarized. 
2.1 The Major Policies for Import Substitution 
In the years following the Second World War, Taiwan 
concentrated on the rehabilitation of war-ravaged industries. 
As the production was gradually restored to its prewar level, 
the first Four-year Economic Plan was launched in 1 952 by the 
government to direct its industrialization. In this regard, 
Taiwan chose an inward-looking development strategy, based 
on import substitution in the manufacturing of nondurable 
consumer goods and intermediate goods. To propell this strate¬ 
gy, the government employed the usual policy package of im¬ 
port controls, multiple exchange rates and tariff protection. 
(I). Import Controls 
Under this policy, the government imposed strict controls 
over imports by means of a licensing system of foreign-exchange 
allocation. All imports were classified into four categories: 
(a) permissible, (b) controlled, (c) suspended and (d) pro¬ 
hibited. The first category included principal daily necessities, 
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raw materials and capital goods, such as wheat, cotton, crude 
oil, chemical fertilizer and machinery. Secondary necessities, 
or commodities thought to hamper domestic manufacturing, were 
placed on the controlled or suspended lists. In the early 
1950s, the goods placed on these categories were plywood, 
rubber shoes, woollen fabrics, monosodium glutamate, cement, 
alcohol, electric cooker and refrigerator, etc. All of which 
could be imported only under special condition, usually by 
government agencies. Luxury consumer goods like cosmetic, 
antique, jewelry, or goods considered dangerous like artillery, 
2 
belonged in the prohibited category. 
During the early 1950s, of the roughly 500 groups of 
manufactures were classified, 55 percent were in permissible 
list, 36 percent were in the controlled and suspended lists, 
and 5 percent in the prohibited list, as shown.in Table 2.1. 
With the acceleration of economic development, the system 
became more stringent. By the mid-1950s, an increasing number 
of goods were shifted from the list of permissible imports 
to suspended or controlled imports. For instance, cotton yarn 
and fabrics, sole leather, and bicycles were permissible 
imports in 1953. But, these commodities were moved to the 
suspended or controlled list in 1956 because growth of pro¬ 
duction in these manufacturing industries rose quickly. During 
2 
Cho-Jung Wang, How Did We Make a Miracle Economy? ( 
Taipei, 1 978), p.14-15. 
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TABLE 2.1 
NUMBERS OF CONTROLS OVER IMPORTED MANUFACTURES, 1953-60 
Year Permissible Controiled Suspended Prohibited Other Total 




































‘"''Imports partly permissible, controlled, suspended, or 
prohibited. 
Source: Mou-Huan Hsing, "Industrial Development and Trade 
Policy," in Collection of Economic Essay of Foreign Trade in 
Taiwan, ed., Chen Sun(Taipei, 1975), p.147. 
this period, commodities suspended or controlled were cotton 
yarn and fabrics, wollen yarn and fabrics, man-made fibers and 
yarn, ammonium sulfate and other chemical fertilizers, wheat 
flour, monosodium glutamate, plywood, leather and leather pro¬ 
ducts, cement, paper, rubber products, aluminum ingots and 
products thereof, sewing machines, bicycles and bicycle parts, 
and soap and cleaning compound!. 
3 
Samuel P.S. Ho, Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860-1970 
(New York: Vail-Ballou Press, 1978), p.191-192. 
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Table 2.1 shows 'the same idea of import substitution. 
In 1956, the percentage of controlled and suspended items 
to total goods increased sharply to 46 percent, whereas the 
share of permissible items dropped to 48 percent. This meant 
that import controls were increasingly emphasized as a means 
of protecting domestic industries rather than only as a re¬ 
medial measure for trade deficits, which was thought the 
main purpose for this instrument at the beginning. However, 
this significant shift did not continue towards the end of 
1950s as a liberalization on import controls was taken. 
(II). Foreign Exchange Policy . 
In line with the restricted import controls, there 
also envolved strict and complicated controls over foreign- 
exchange allocation. In 1949, under the simple exchange 
system, all foreign-exchange earnings were required to be 
sold to the government(Bank of Taiwan). The holder was 
given 20 percent in cash at the official rate of NT$ 5 per 
US dollar, and 80 percent in exchange settlement certificates 
(ESCs) of equivalent value. These ESCs were freely negotiable 
in market or could be sold to the government at the official 
rate. Importers applying for official foreign exchange were 
required to submit ESCs. 
Owing to the constant trade deficits, a multiple ex¬ 
change system was introduced in April 1951. Exchange rates 
applicable to imports of goods by the public sector, important 
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raw materials, and intermediate inputs by private sector, 
were given a lower official rate relative to rates for the 
importation of other goods. For exporters, exchange earn¬ 
ings of government enterprises were given a lower rate than 
those of private enterprises^" 
The primary of objectives of the policy was to en¬ 
courage import substitution and exporting. In the public 
sector, exchange rates applicable to imports were much the 
same as those applicable to exports. But, in the private 
sector, the rate for the importation of raw materials and 
capital goods were lower than those for finished consumer 
goods. In 1 953,. for example, the official rate for the above 
three group(public enterpris, exporter of private sector, 
importer of finished consumer goods) were NT$ 10.35, NT$ 
5 
14.75 and NT$ 15.90 per US dollar, respectively. Thus, there 
is a substantial import tax for the latter. The influence 
on the direction of economic activity favored import-sub¬ 
stituting industries. Nevertheless, the measure did not 
solve, as the government had hoped, the balance-of-payments 
problem and encourage exporting due to several devaluations. 
The whole system was revised again in Novermber 1958. 
(III). Tariff Protection 
^"Chung-Jung Yin, "The Trade System in Taiwan," in 
Collection of Economic Essay of Foreign Trade in Taiwan, 
ed., Chen Sun(Taipei, 1962), p.2-3. 
5Ibid., p.2. 
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Besides the restrictions on foreign trade and exchange 
controls, import substitution can also be carried out behind 
high tariff walls. For Taiwan, tariffs could not work effec¬ 
tively in the beginning, since the tariff structures were 
designed for the totally different economy of mainland China. 
The latter emphasized more protection for the production of 
raw materials than of finished goods. 
In order to foster import substitution and financial 
revenue, the tariff schedule enacted in 1948 was revised 
in 1955. Although there was no important change in the re¬ 
vised schedule, tariff rates were raised on both finished 
goods and intermediate inputs of many finished goods for 
protecting the domestic infant industries. By the mid-1950s, 
the output in several light-manufacturing industries had 
increased to supply an estimated 77 percent of apparent 
domestic consumption. This was particularly true for the 
production on textile products, wood products and rubber 
goods. The rates of import duties payable by cotton 
were 14*4 percent both in 1949 and 1955, but those payable 
by cotton yarn were 8.4 percent and 22.8 percent in 1949 
and 1955 respectively. Similarly, for cotton goods, arti¬ 
ficial fibers, synthetic fibers, wheat flour, logs, plywood, 
glss bottle, coconut oil, and printing paper, etc., there 
appeared to have been same protection during the same time. 
DYu-Chi Tao, Chinese Customs Tariffs: System and Practic 
(Taipei, 1968), p.68. 
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TABLE 2.2 
THE STRUCTURE OF TARIFF RATES, 1948-65(percentage) 
Tariff Rates 1948 1 955 1 959 1 965 
Below 30$ 39.6 38.7 48.0 49.7 
30-50$ 28.7 29.8 22.7 23.9 
50-100$ 21.5 20.0 21 .1 20.4 
Above 100$ 1 0.2 11.4 8.2 6.0 
Source : Yu-Chi Tao, Chinese Customs Tariffs: System 
and Practice(Taipei, 1968), p. 174- 
Table 2.2 shows the structure of tariff schedule 
during 1948 to 1965. In 1955» the number of items in the 
ranges of tariff rates below 30 percent accounted 39 per¬ 
cent of total, 30 percent in the ranges 30-50 percent, 20 
percent in the ranges 50-100 percent, and 11 percent in 
the ranges above 100 percent, all of which is not much 
different to 1948. In other words, items with rates of 
tariff above 30 percent remained around 60 percent of the 
total. This represents a high degree of protection in 
favor of import-substituting strategy. 
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Among these measures, the process of import substi¬ 
tution in Taiwan had-been more strongly influenced by the 
system of foreign exchange and import controls than by 
tariff policy, especially as a policy instrument for infant 
industry promotion and protection.' Although there are ad¬ 
verse effects on production costs, technological change, 
and product quality, these measures undoubtedly increased 
the profitability of import substitution and must had been 
responsible for the doubling of manufacturing production 
between 1952 to 1958. 
2.2 The Major Policies for Export Substitution 
The main purpose of trade policies during this period 
was to promote exports and encourage investment in labor- 
intensive industries. To shift the economic path, the govern¬ 
ment revised the policy package for import substitution on 
one hand, and applied a system of incentive measure to pro¬ 
mote exports on the other hand. These policies were announced 
in the 19-point economic and financial reform in April 1960. 
These two transition program, especially the export incentive 
schemes, have activated the economic development of Taiwan 
throughout the last two decades. 
(I). Foreign Exchange Reform 
7 
Samuel P.S. Ho, Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860- 
1_97_0(New York: Vail-Ballou Press, 1 978), p. 111 . 
30 
The multiple exchange system produced the desired 
effect on import substitution. But, owing to continuous 
inflation, the exchange rate had become overvalued. When 
the official exchange rate is overvalued, exporters receive 
less domestic currency than they should, and importers pay 
less domestic currency than they should. For instance, in 
1957 the official rates applied to imports and exports per 
U.S. dollar was NT$ 24.78-32.38, but the average market 
O 
selling rate per U.S. dollar was 38.40° An overvaluation 
of domestic currency thus discouraged exports and encouraged 
imports. 
View the result, a foreign exchange reform was an¬ 
nounced in April 1958. First, the multiple exchange rates 
were simplified into two rates. Imports and exports handled 
or produced by public sector were given a lower exchange 
rate; other imports and exports .handled by private sector 
were given a higher rate. Then, the lower rate was adjusted 
to a higher rate, and those on a fixed higher rate were 
brought to seek a more realistic rate through the transaction 
in the market of ESCs issued to private sector. Finally, 
exchange rates were to apply equally to all kinds of exports 
and imports. By the July1960, the difference between the 
offical rate and the market selling rate become insignificant? 
8 
Samuel P.S. Ho, Economic Development of Taiwan, 1 80O 
-1 970(New York: Vail-Ballou Press, 1 978), p.193. 
^Chung-Jung Yin, My View on the Economy of Taiwan ( Taipei, 
1963), vol.2, p.130-149. 
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After 1963» the unification of exchange rates was completed 
at a rate of NT$ 40 per U.S. dollar and the system of ESCs 
was also abolished. 
(II). Import Liberalization 
A. Import Controls 
The economic policy change also reflected greater 
import liberalization in the 1960s. In the first place, the 
restrictions on imports of materials and equipment used to 
export were very substantially released after 1965. To pro¬ 
vide an incentive, exporters could almost get whatever ma¬ 
terials they wanted in spite of the fact that the items 
concerned were not properly decontrolled. For other commodi 
ties, the liberalization was not really undertaken until 
1964 when the balance-of-payment difficulties were improved 
During 1960-63, 105 items were removed from the controlled 
list, againt the addition of 160 items to the list. From 
1964 to 1970, very few items were added to the controlled 
list, while many items were shifted onto the permissible 
list. After 1970 most controls on imports were swapt away, 
more than 4000 items were eased. By 1976, controls only 
remained on few goodâP 
1 0 Maurice Scott, "Foreign Trade," in Economic Growth 
and Structure Change in Taiwan, ed., Walter Galenson(Ithaca 
Cornell University Press, 1978), p.330-331. 
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Second, the category of suspended in the system of 
import restrictions was abolished. Most goods were moved 
into other categories, mainly the controlled list. Further¬ 
more, the application for placing imports on the controlled 
list was made to meet new criteria. Under the new require¬ 
ment, the domestic producers seeking protection had to de¬ 
monstrate that their products exhibited an acceptable quality 
and that the quantity was large enough to meet the domestic 
demand. Yet, the price could not exceed the import cost of 
the comparable product by more than 25 percent. This allow¬ 
ance was reduced to 15 percent in 1964» and to 10 percent 
in 1968, A time limit of three years was set for restricted 
. . 11' items. 
These policies were examples of the government's 
attempt to substitute tariff protection for non-tariff pro¬ 
tection in order to achieve industrial efficiency. Because, 
there is no motivation for the domestic infant industries 
under non-tariff protection to improve technology and pro¬ 
duct quality due to the lack of competition. Under tariff 
protection, the domestic industries still have to face the 
competition from other countries through the market. Hence, 
in term of promoting production efficiency, tariff is a 
more welcomed measure than non-tariff protection. 
11 Ibid., 331-332. 
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B. Revision of Tariff Schedule 
In keeping with export promotions, the tariff schedule 
was revised in 1959» 1965, 1968 and 1973 respectively. In 
the revised schedules of 1959» tariff rates were reduced 
on a number of finished goods(such as woolen products, man¬ 
made fiber yarn, hydrochloric acid, iron rods and bars, 
bicycles, etc.), but also on their principal imported inputs 
(such inputs as wool, man-made fiber, wheat, soy beans, am¬ 
monia, steel ingots, and parts for bicycle, etc.). In the 
1965 and 1968 revision, tariff rates on a number of import 
manufactures, including rayon and other man-made fiber spun 
yarn, cement, caustic soda, automobiles, motocycles, and 
household refrigerators, were reduced. The rates of some 
raw materials and semi-manufactures increased substantially, 
indicating the importance of the system of tax rebate for 
1 2 
export promotion. With the liberalization on import controls 
in the early 1970s, tariff rates on many finished goods, 
including some luxury, were raised in the 1973 revision. 
This was partly because the rates of raw materials and semi¬ 
manufactures were higher than those of finished, and partly 
because the government tried to use high tariffs instead of 
restrict controls over imports. 
1 2 
Mou-Huan Hsing, "Industrial Development and Trade 
Policy," in Collection of Economic Essay of Foreign Trade 
in Taiwan, ed. , Chen Sun(Taipei, 1 975), p.147—151- 
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(III). Export Incentives 
Exports were promoted in Taiwan by a series of mea¬ 
sures, all based on the essential spirit of the 1960's 19- 
point economic and financial reform. Their special important 
to export expansion will be explained below. 
A. Tax Rebate System 
The tax rebate system was one of the most important 
export incentives. It was introduced in 1952 and given on 
imported materials used for making straw hats. When several 
manufacturing industries, such as plywood, cotton fabrics, 
woollen yarn and fabrics, attained high ratios of import 
substitution and began to export in 1954» a general system 
of rebates was extended to cover all exports. Initially, 
customs duty was the only kind of tax rebates. From 1955 to 
1964, the scope of rebate was broadened to include commodity 
tax, defense surtax, harbor charge, salt tax, and slaughter 
tax^ 
Customs duty and commodity tax refunds for exportation 
are shown in Table 2.3. The respones of tax rebate system 
was slow before the 1960s since the policy incentives were 
1 3 Wen-Han Chang, " The Program of Tax Rebate and Public 
Finance," in Collection of Economic Essay of Taxation in 
Taiwan, ed., Chong-Hsien Yu(Taipei, 1968), p. 158-169. 
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TABLE 2.3 
TAX REDUCTION AND REFUNDS ON CUSTOMS DUTIES AND 
COMMODITY TAX(AS PERCENTAGE OF THE CORRESPONDING TAX) 
(percent) 
Custom Commodity 
Year Duties Ratio Tax Ratio 
1 955 2.3 0.2 
1 956 4.2 0.3 
1 957 2.9 3.0 
1 958 6.6 2.8 
1 960 13.5 8.5 
1 961 14.5 12.5 
1 962 20.3 24.3 
1 963 21 .6 13.0 
1 964 38.8 1 8.0 
1 965 31 .0 21 .2 
1 966 32.6 20.1 
1 967 40.5 22.0 
Customs Commodity 
Year Duties Ratio Tax Ratio 
1 968 39.2 23.0 
1 969 36.4 18.7 
1 970 49.2 25.1 
1 971 77.3 34.3 
1 972 86.1 37.3 
1 973 72.3 37.6 
1 974 46.2 31 .7 
1 975 54.6 37.7 
1 976 42.2 37.3 
1 977 57.2 40.6 
1 978 40.5 36.0 
1 979 40.3 35.2 
Source: Shirley W.Y. Kuo, Gustav Ranis, and John C.H. 
Fei, The Taiwan Success Story: Rapid Growth with Improved 
Distribution in the Repblic of China, 1 952-1 979(Colorado : 
Westview Press, Inc., 1981), p.70. 
not completely implemented. With the expansion of exports, 
the refund on customs duties and commodity tax began to in¬ 
crease after 1960. The highest refund on customs duties was 
from 1971 to 1973 because of the rapid growth of exports. 
During the economic recession in 1974» a sudden reduction 
occurred. In 1979, the percentage of customs duties refund 
reduced to only about 40 percent of total customs duties. 
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For the refund on commodity tax, there was the same tendency 
as that on customs duties. 
Over the same period, some regulations for application 
of tax rebates were also lessened or liberalized. When first 
initiated, 20 percent of the refundable taxes were charged 
as an operation fee and the time limit for tax rebates was 
set at 3 months for the time of importation of the required 
raw materials. The fee rate was reduced to 5 percent in 1954, 
1.5 percent in 1955, 1 percent in 1959, and 0.5 percent in 
1961. The time limit was changed to 6-12 months in 1958, 
and 12 months in 1961. After 12 months but within 18 months, 
the tax rebates could only be made at a discount, which was 
80 percent for tax paid in cash and 70 percent for tax lia¬ 
bility f 
B. Bonded Factories and Warehouses and 
Export Processing Zones 
When a bonding system was established in 1965, the 
tax rebate procedures were greatly simplified. Under the 
system, taxes on imported materials for manufactured ex¬ 
ports in bonded warehouse or factory can be unpaid or be 
offset by the guarantee of banks or other financial 
1 4 
Ching-Yuang Lin, Industrialization in Taiwan, 1946- 
1972(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p.101—110. 
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1 5 institutions. By 1968, a total of fourteen bonded factories 
and nineteen bonded warehouses had been set up, whose major 
exports and inputs were sawed wood, plywood, scrap iron bars 
and rods, galvanized steel pipe and sheet, hemp clothe and 
sacks, wearing apparel, wool tops, plastic flowers, radio, 
wheat flour, and monosodium glutamate. 
Another important development was the establishment of 
export processing zones, whose primary purpose was to increase 
exports by attracting foreign investment. The plants set up 
in the zone were given all of the tax benefits, in addition, 
were allowed to use the well-developed plant sites or factory 
building, water and power supply, harbor warehouse and other 
facilities, which were all provided by the government. The 
first export processing zone at port of Kaoshiung was formally 
opened in December 1966. As enthusiastic responses were re¬ 
ceived from investors, the government proceeded to construct 
two more zones: the second at Nantz, near Kaoshiung, and the 
t.hird at Taichung, a city in central Taiwan. 
From 1967 to 1972, 186 manufacturing or processing 
plants were set up in three export processing zones(EPZ). 
Although the application to set up in the zones fell off 
1 5 Wen-Hsiung Sung, A Study of the Chinese Tax Rebate 
System (. Taipei , 1 965), p.60. 
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after 1973 due to the world recession, currently there are 
266 manufacturing companies in three zones, of which 126 
are in the Kaoshiung EPZ, 90 in Nantz EPZ, and 50 in Taichung 
EPZ. According to statistics compiled by the Export Processing 
Zone Administration, the three zones had attracted a total of 
US$ 146 million in foreign and overseas Chinese investment 
since the first of the zones was established, around 6.0 per¬ 
cent of total foreign investment over the same period. Be¬ 
tween 1 967 to 1981, exports accumulated to US$ 8,337 million, 
and imports US$ 4.641 million, leaning a surplus of US$ 3.696 
million. Total employment amounted to 81,000 people in the 
zones, accounted for 7 percent of total employment in manu- 
1 
facturing. 
After 15 years of successful operation, it is universally 
agreed that the three export processing zones in Taiwan have 
made substantial contributions to economic development. Many 
countries, including Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and 
Panama, have sent officials to study the operation of export 
processing zones. 
In the 1970s, the country faced its most difficult 
economic challenge. To maintain the growth of its foreign 
trade, Taiwan needed to increase the range and quality of 
its exports. In 1980, the Hsinchu Science Industrial Park 
^^Eree China Weekly, January 3. 1983. 
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was opened. The emphasis here was on the research and develop¬ 
ment of new products to change the country's industrial image 
completely. The science park is patterned after the Standford 
Industrial Park and North Carolina's Research Triangle Park, 
which has the densest collection of high technology industries 
and research institutes in the world. Located about halfway 
between Taipei in the north and Taichung in the central Taiwan, 
the science park is close to the Taoyuan international airport 
and Keelung and Taichung ports, but also is next door to some 
of Taiwan's most prestigious higher learning establishments, 
which are noted for their advanced laboratories for research 
and development and can provide a steady supply of skilled 
manpower. 
So far, 37 plants and laboratories of various sizes 
have been approved to open up in the science park, and of 
these 23 are in operation and 17 are already marketing their 
products. Most of the plants are in the electronics, infor¬ 
mation, precision and machinery industries. Of the invest¬ 
ments, one third comes from the U.S., one third from over- 
1 7 
seas Chinese and the rest mainly from European countries. 
C. Cheap Loans for Exporters 
1 7 
Free China Weekly, Novermber 14» 1982. 
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To give preferential interest rates for export financing, 
a special export loan program was initiated in 1957 by the Bank 
of Taiwan. The interest rates was offered at 6 percent per 
annum for loans repayable in foreign currencies and 11.88 per¬ 
cent per annum if repayable in NT dollars. These rates were 
essentially less than the 19.8 percent on secured loans to 
private enterprises, or than 36 percent per year charged by 
private moneylenders. The favorable loans for exporting firms 
have been available since then. In December 1978, the rates 
on export loans was 6.5 percent per annum compared with the 
lowest rate 11.5 percent on secured loans and 25.8 percent 
1 8 for the cheapest loan in unorganized money market in Taiwan? 
D. Private Schemes to Promote Exports 
Beside the incentive measures provided by the govern¬ 
ment, the private exporting firms have also acted to promote 
each other's exports during the late 1950s and throughout the 
1960s and 1970s. The authorities encouraged the domestic in¬ 
dustries to organize sectoral associations or trade corpora¬ 
tions to reduce the pressure of competition on the domestic 
market by control of the production, and also to promote ex¬ 
port sales. 
18 -, - Sue-Tien Chen, Price Level and Interest Rates in 
Taiwan(Taipei, 1979)» p.117-122; and also, R.O.C. Taiwan 
Provincial Government. Taiwan Economy. September 20, 1979. 
No.33, p.72. 
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Under the agreements signed by the firms and approved 
by the proper government agencies, the sectoral association 
could collect an agreed amount of cooperative fund from their 
members and then pay out an agreed amount of export bounties 
to subsidize the exporters. Each member firm is allocated an 
export quota in proportion to its output, and is required to 
pay a penalty if its export sales fall short. In the case of 
cotton textiles, the agreement required: (1) each firm had to 
pay out 20 percent of the landed value of imported raw cotton 
to their sectoral association as the export-bonus fund. (2) 
each firm was allocated an export quota at 40 percent of its 
output at domestic market. (3) if exceed 40 percent, each firm 
had to pay a penalty of US$ 1.18 per bale of cotton yarn. (4) 
the export bonus was set at 5 percent of FOB value on expor¬ 
tation. In addition to cotton textiles, the manufacturing in- 
distries in cement, paper, steel products, rubber maunfactures, 
monosodium glutamate, and woollen textiles have same kind of 
1 9 association during the smae time. 
As already stated, many other measures were also under¬ 
taken by the government or its agencies. For instance, export 
insurance was improved and cheapened, and special awards were 
made to enterprises in the machinery industry for the develop- 
'Ching-Yuang Lin, Industrialization in Taiwan, 1946- 
1972(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p.108-110. 
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ment of new products and expansion of exports. In general, all 
of these measures made it possible for Taiwan's industries to 
apply large-scale production methods in consumer goods, and 
has led to improvements in technological methods and in pro¬ 
duct quality. In other words, the outward-looking strategy 
offers possibilities to utilize appropriately the country's 
resources for economic development. This strategy may be used 
to exploit the opportunities available in other developing 
countries. 
CHAPTER III 
THE STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE 
3.1 General Characteristics 
A. The Aggregate Performance 
of Foreign Trade 
The story of Taiwan's foreign trade since World War II 
has been remarkable. Between 1952 and 1979» the value of Tai¬ 
wan's trade increased one hundred fold, from US$ 303 million 
to US$ 30,876 million. The average rate of growth of foreign 
trade rose 20 percent per annum(see Table 3.1). This compared 
with the growth rate of 4*75 percent in world trade, 4.26 per¬ 
cent in the trade of developed countries, and 5.56 percent in 
developing countries' trade expansion. 
As Taiwan industrialized, its external trade also 
altered in significant ways. The postwar performance of foreign 
trade is summarized in Table 3.1. The growth rates are arranged 
into four subperiods(1952-57, 1958-62, 1963-72, 1973-1979) re¬ 
presenting the four phases of Taiwan's postwar industrializa- 
1 
These figures are derived from United Nation, Yearbook 




GROWTH RATES IN FOREIGN TRADE, 1952-1979 
(percent) 
Phase of Development Period Total TTI 1 T . Trade ExPorts Imports 
Average of Whole Period 1952-79 1 9.81 21 .67 1 9. 08 
Easy Import Substitution 1952-57 3.78 7.32 2.74 
Transition to Export Promotion 1958-62 7.92 8.24 8.04 
Primary Export Substitution 1963-72 26.82 30.67 23.80 
Transition to 2nd Import and 
Export substitution 1973-79 29.76 28.67 31 .89 
Source: Calculation on the basis of statistics provided in 
ROC, CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book(Taipei, 1 982) , p.185. 
tion: easy import substitution, transition to export promotion, 
primary export substitution, and transition to 2nd import and 
export substitution. 
After rehabilitation of war-torn industries in 1949-51, 
the pace of industrialization turned into import substitution. 
From 1952 to 1957, foreign trade grew by an average rate of 
only 3.78 percent a year. Indeed, at the outset of this period 
the inward-looking strategy apparently was more successful. 
But, by the mid-1950s, the economy and foreign trade became 
sluggish. The growth rate of trade slowed to -5.0 percent in 
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1954» 6.6 percent in 1955, and -3.7 percent in 1966. Thus, 
the government initiated numerous reforms and measures to 
promote industrialization and export during 1958 to 1962. 
In this phase, foreign trade as a whole experienced marked 
improvement; annual growth rate of trade rose to 7.92 per¬ 
cent; exports increased at 8.24 percent and imports at 8.02 
percent. The main impact of the 1958-60 reforms was on export. 
From 1963 to 1972, exports grew very rapidly, sustaining and 
accelerated growth record few countries can maintain. Before 
the reforms were fully completed, exports grew at a rate of 
only 7.8 percent a year. After 1962, the value of Taiwan's 
exports more than tripled, with an annual average growth 
rate of over 30 percent. Primarily because export grew rapid¬ 
ly , imports experienced similiar change in growth, increasing 
at nearly 24 percent per year since 1962. 
This quick trade expansion was checked by the oil crisis 
and world recession after 1973. The growth of exports dropped 
from 25.8 percent in 1974 to -5.9 percent in 1975, while im¬ 
ports increased at a rate of 83.7 percent in 1974 and than 
fall to -14*6 percent in 1975. Although exports rose strongly 
in 1976 to an all time high of 53.8 percent and imports re¬ 
stored to 27.7 percent, the world environment was not as 
favorable as before to Taiwan's foreign trade. Therfore, for 
growth to be continued, the manufacturing sector moved into 
a second import and export substitution phase to increase the 
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range and quality of consumer and industrial products for ex¬ 
port. In 1973-79» exports deteriorated at an annual rate of 
28 percent, whereas imports continued to grow at a rate of 
31 percent a year. 
B. Development in the Balance of Payments 
Another measure of trade development can be guaged by 
the balance of payments. An appreciation of the balance-of- 
payment position will help to understand the process of for¬ 
eign trade. Table 3.2 presents the balance-of-payment position 
of Taiwan for the period 1952-1980. 
Generally, the postwar deficits lasted throughout the 
1950s and 1960s. During the 1950s, the huge trade deficits 
resulted from the slow growth of exports and large imports of 
capital equipment and intermediate goods. In addition, the 
inflow of private capital and loans from international finan¬ 
cial organization was insignificant. Hence, the large deficit 
gap in this period was filled only by the huge amount of 
United States economic aid, which dominate transfer payments 
in Table 3.2. According to one observation, the deficits on 
goods and services in the 1950s accounted for 35-64 percent 
of annual imports, and U.S. aid amounted to 67-128 percent of 
2 
the every year trade deficits. 
2 
Ching-Yuang Lin, Industrialization in Taiwan, 1946— 
1 972(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1 973), p.70. 
TABLE 3.2 
























Exports of Goods 
Servi ce 
and 
364 452 556 874 1 705 31 57 7505 1 7920 34440 41289 
Imports of Goods 
Service 
and 
-676 -727 -931 -1146 -1767 -3413 -6865 -19077 -31387 -41447 
Balance of Goods 
Service 
and 
-31 2 -275 -375 -272 -62 -256 640 -1157 3053 -1 58 
Net Transfer Payments 272 21 5 262 1 98 76 48 44 22 -5 -317 
Net Capital Movement 25 15 136 1 78 1 78 321 272 15 92 1 578 1 033 
Net Foreign Assets of 
the Banking System 1 5 51 -31 -1 05 -125 -139 -941 -344 -4147 31 
Net Errors and 
Omissions 0 -6 8 1 -67 26 -1 5 -113 -479 -589 
Current Deficits as 
Percent of Imports 46.2 37.8 40.3 23.7 3.5 7.5 6.1 0.38 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, various 
issues; ROC, CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book(Taipei,1982), p.179. 
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The strong export expansion of Taiwan in the 1960s and 
1970s has exerted an important improvement in its current 
balance of pay-ments. Although the trade deficits existed in 
almost every year of 1960s(with United States aid ending in 
1965), the deficits as share of imports declined steadily 
from a high of 24 percent in 1961-63 to less than 8 percent 
in 1967-69. Beginning in the early 1970s, Taiwan’s trade po¬ 
sition became favorable, except for the economic crises in 
1973-75 and 1979-80. Furthermore, the accelerated growth of 
the export not only led to a sharp rise in foreign exchange 
reserve, but also brought about a substantial increase in 
net capital inflow(see Table 3.2). 
C. United States Aid and Foreign Investment 
From 1951 to 1965, United States aid played a crucial 
role in helping Taiwanese economic development. Particularly, 
it assisted the island in growth and stability following the 
economic chaos in the early 1950s. Before 1950, the economic 
conditions of Taiwan were far from stable, and the government 
was inert to bring down a rising inflation and a increasing 
trade deficits. But, at the end of 1950, these uncertainties 
were controlled by the timely arrival of massive U.S. aid. 
The main reasons were: First, with the resumption of U.S. 
aid, confidence was restored to the island. Second, U.S. mi¬ 
litary aid lessen government expenditure on military budget. 
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Third, U. S. economic assistance provided Taiwan with large 

















1951-55 396.8 11 0.4 507.2 427.2 1,057.7 40.3 
1956-60 329.0 1 92.3 521 .3 441.8 1,209.8 36.5 
1961-65 336.6 79.2 41 5.8 370.1 1,952.9 18.9 
1966-68 37.9 -- 37.9 85.4 2,372.9 3.5 
Total 1,100.3 381 .9 1 ,482.2 1,324.5 6,593.3 20.0 
Source: R.O.C. Council for Economic Planning and Develop- 
ment, Taiwan Statistical Data Book(Taipei, 1982), p., 223. 
Table 3.3 shows the trend and composition of U.S. eco¬ 
nomic aid to Taiwan. From 1951 to the termination of economic 
aid in 1965, the country received over US$ 1.4 billion, about 
US$ 100 million a year. In 1950s, U.S. economic assistance 
financed almost 38 percent of Taiwan's imports. For the whole 
period, about 20 percent of total imports were aid financed. 
3 
Samuel P.S. Ho, Economic Development of Taiwan, I860 
-1 970(New York: Vail-Ballou Press, 1 978), p.110. 
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The distribution of U.S. economic aid was allocated in three 
directions : (1 ) non-project assistance, which took the form 
of commodity-import program that generated local currency 
counterpart funds for helping to control inflation and build¬ 
ing up infrastructure and social activities. (2) project as¬ 
sistance. This was directly linked with Taiwan's economic 
planning and assisted the capital goods-import program in 
making the economy grow. (3) technical assistance, which aided 
the government in training people to design and implement 
economic policy^ 
In the process -of economic development of Taiwan, do¬ 
mestic capital has come minly from the private sector, follow¬ 
ed by the government and public enterprises. Foreign capital 
is composed of U.S. aid, loans from international institutions 
and private foreign organizations, private foreign investor 
and overseas Chinese** As a whole, the impact of foriegn ca¬ 
pital investment in Taiwan's economic development is helpful, 
but not crucial one. From 1952 to 1980, the cumulative pri¬ 
vate foreign investment constituted only 3.9 percent of do¬ 
mestic capital formation, as shown in Table 3.4. 
Common to almost all developing countries, at the in¬ 
itial stage of economic development, the supply of domestic 
^Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan(New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1966), p.38-54.205-215. 
5 
K.T. Li, The Experience of Dynamic Economic Grwoth on 
Taiwan(Taipei : Mei Ya Publication, Inc., 1 976), p.121. 
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TABLE 3.4 
CAPITAL FORMATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 1952-1980 




U.S. Aid, Foreign 
Capital and Loans 




. , Percent 
Amount Qf GDCF 
1952-54 9,908 1 02 1 .0 4,358 43.9 
1955-57 15,877 1 99 1 .3 5,775 36.4 
1958-60 30,253 659 2.2 12,658 41 .8 
1961-63 43,900 2,004 4.6 1 0,621 24.2 
1964-66 74,950 3,633 4.8 5,082 6.8 
1967-69 131,562 10,253 7.8 1 0,159 7.7 
1970-72 208,1 47 17,140 8.2 -25,651 -12.3 
1973-75 513,745 21 ,183 4.1 43,762 8.5 
1976-78 726,01 8 19,698 2.7 -108,675 -1 4.9 
1979-80 893,411 28,676 3.2 10,858 1 .2 
1952-60 56,038 960 1 .7 22,791 40.7 
1 961 -69 250,412 15,890 6.3 25,862 1 0.3 
1970-80 2,341 ,321 86,697 3.7 -79,706 -3.4 
1952-80 2,647,771 103,547 3.9 -31 ,053 -1 .2 
Source: ROC. CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book(Taipei, 
1982), p.47,48,238; Gustav Ranis, "Industrial Development," 
in Economie Growth and Structure Change in Taiwan, ed., Walter 
Galenson(Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1 978), p.250. 
52 
capital in Taiwan was very limited because of low income, 
poor saving, and a lack of incentive and ability on the 
part of the private sector to invest. Thus, the domestic 
capital had to be complemented by foreign capital. Actually, 
for the critical years 1952-60, private foreign investment 
was negligible, only about 1.7 percent of total gross do¬ 
mestic capital formation. In this period, U.S. aid was the 
main source of Taiwan's investment capital, which accounted 
for 40 percent of domestic capital. It seems fair to believe 
that without U.S. aid to the island the pace of economic 
development might have been much slower. 
The 1960s were years of rapid growth for Taiwan. The 
share of U.S. aid as a source of investment capital began to 
decline. Prior to the termination in 1965, U.S. aid had not 
only been decreased but also shifted from grants to loans to 
an increasing degree. Moreover, by 1970, the net contribu¬ 
tion of U.S. aid, foreign capital and loan had been become 
negative owing to the repatriation of profits and repayment 
of loan. 
As can be observed from Table 3.4, private foreign 
investment grew steadily from 1 960, but only remained a 
^Gustav Ranis, "Industrial Development," in Economic 
Growth and Structure Change in Taiwan, ed., Walter Galenson 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1978), p.251. 
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small proportion of total domestic capital, around 4 percent 
to 8 percent during the 1960s and early 1970s. Due to lower 
wage cost in Taiwan than in developed countries, foreign in¬ 
vestor participated mainly in the labor-intensive industries. 
However, with the transformation of the economic struture, 
this is no longer so. Private foreign investment has been 
reduced in both absolute and relative terms since 1974. 
For geographic and political reasons, foreign capital 
has mostly come from overseas Chinese(mainly Hong Kong and 
southeast Asia), U.S. investor, the Japanese, and other 
from Europe. Over the period 1952-80 a total of US$ 2,718 
million(NT$ 103,547 million) of investment were approved of 
which 35 percent from overseas Chinese, 29 percent form the 
7 
USA, 17 percent from Japan and 10 percent from Europe. 
3.2 The Corn-position of Trade 
A. Commodity Patterns 
The changing composition of exports and imports are 
shown in Table 3.5 amd 3.6 respectively. Before the war, 
Taiwan traded primarily with Japan. Exports were composed 
7 1 The Asia Pacific Centre, ed. The Markets of Asia/ 
Pacific- Taiwan(New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1982), p.85. 
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TABLE 3.5 




Agricultural . Industrial 
Products Agricultural Products Products 
Total 
1 952 22.1 69.8 8.1 1 00 
1 953 13.8 77.8 8.4 1 00 
1 954 13.3 76.1 1 0.6 1 00 
1 955 28.1 61 .5 1 0.4 1 00 
1 956 18.5 64.5 17.0 1 00 
1 957 1 5.9 71 .5 Ï27ïï 1 00 
1 958 23.7 62.3 14.0 1 00 
1 959 23.6 52.8 23.6 1 00 
1 960 1 2. 0 55.7 32.3 1 00 
1 961 1 4.8 44.3 40.9 1 00 
1962 11.9 37.6 50.5 1 00 
T9&3 13.5 45.4 41 .1 1 00 
1964 15.0 42.5 42.5 1 00 
1 965 23.6 30.4 46.0 1 00 
1 966 1 9.8 25.1 55.1 1 00 
1 967 15.2 23.2 61 .6 1 00 
1 968 11.1 20.5 68.4 1 00 
ï!£9 9.3 16.7 74.0 1 00 
1 970 8.6 12.8 78.6 1 00 
1 971 7.9 11.2 80.9 1 00 
1 972 6.8 9.9 83.3 1 00 
1 973 7.5 7.9 84.6 1 00 
1 974 4.8 1 0.7 84.5 1 00 
1 975 5.6 1 0.8 83.6 1 00 
1 976 5.0 7.4 87.6 1 00 
1 977 5.4 7.1 87.5 1 00 
1 978 5.0 5.8 89.2 1 00 
1 979 4.4 5.1 90.5 1 00 
1 980 3.6 5.6 90.8 1 00 
Source: ROC. Council for Economie Planning and Develop¬ 
ment, Taiwan Statistical Data Book(Taipei,1982), p.190 
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TABLE 3.6 










1 952 1 4.2 65.9 1 9.9 1 00 
1 953 15.6 67.1 1 7.3 1 00 
1 954 15.1 72.3 12.6 1 00 
1 955 16.5 74.7 8.8 1 00 
1 956 18.7 73.9 7.4 1 00 
1 957 2076" 72.5 6.9 1 00 
1 958 21 .8 71 .8 6.4 1 00 
1 959 25.1 67.5 7.4 1 00 
1 960 27.9 64.O 8.1 1 00 
1 961 26.4 63.5 1 0.1 1 00 
1 962 23.4 68.3 8.3 roo 
T9SJ 21 .4 72.1 6.5 1 00 
1 964 22.1 71 .8 6.1 1 00 
1 965 29.3 65.6 5.1 1 00 
1 966 29.4 65.5 5.1 1 00 
1 967 32.1 63.2 4.7 1 00 
1 968 32.5 62. 9 4.6 . 1 00 
T9S9 34.7 é0.8 4.5 1 00 
1 970 32.3 62.8 4.9 1 00 
1 971 32. 0 62. 9 5.1 1 00 
1 972 31 .1 63.2 5.7 1 00 
1 973 28.6 65.8 5.6 1 00 
1 974 30.7 62.4 6.9 1 00 
1 975 3Ô7£ Sffb “£78 1 00 
1 976 29.1 64.7 6.2 1 00 
1 977 25.8 66.4 7.8 1 00 
1 978 24.7 68. 5 6.8 1 00 
1 979 24.6 69.0 6.4 1 00 
1 980 23.4 70.8 5.8 1 00 
Source: ROC. Council for Economie Planning and Develop¬ 
ment, Taiwan Statistical Data Book(Taipei,1 982), p.191 - 
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mainly of foodstuffs, mostly rice and sugar. Imports were 
industrial goods such as cotton textiles and chemical fer¬ 
tilizers. By the end of the Second World War, the trade of 
Taiwan had fallen substantially and did not recover until 
1950. After 1950, the commodity composition had changed 
progressively with the industrialization of the economy. 
Compared to the 1950s, the 1970s saw a big shift in the com¬ 
modity composition of exports with only a little alteration 
in imports. In 1950, exports of unprocessed and processed 
foodstuffs were as high as 90 percent of total exports, but 
declined to about 9 percent in 1980 despite serveral new 
kinds of agricultural products such as bananas, bamboo shorts, 
ramie, other certain canned foodstuffs and fishing products. 
In contrast to the fall in the share of foodstuffs in 
total exports, there has been a sharp increase in that of 
industrial products. Table 3.5 shows that a drastic change 
came after 1958, when the 1958-60 reforms was taken. The 
export of industrial goods grew slowly before 1958, but rose 
rapidly since then. The share of industrial exports accounted 
for only 8 percent in 1952, 23 percent in 1959» about 80 
percent in 1970, and nearly 90 percent in 1980. This amounts 
to an average annual rate of increase of 30 percent in 1960s 
and 28 percent in 1970s(see Table 3.1). 
Likewise, Taiwan's industrialization has had an effect 
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on imports. Reflecting the development policy of import sub¬ 
stitution in 1 950s, the' ratio of consumption goods in total 
imports was 20 percent in 1952, then fell to around 4 percent 
in the mid-1060s. However, the recovery in the share of con¬ 
sumer products in the late of 1970s was caused by the import 
liberalization and a significant improvement in the nation's 
living standards. Since the island is poor in natural re¬ 
sources, imports of agricultural and industrial raw materials 
remained constant through the years and that of capital goods 
has changed much less, particularly since the rise in oil 
price after 1973- 
B. Concentration Patterns 
one country is related to the size and stage of its economic 
growth. The relations between trade pattern and its econmic 
growth can be measured by calculating various coefficients 
of trade concentration. The coefficient of commodity concen¬ 
tration of exports, Cx, can be defined by the following for¬ 
(1). Commodity Concentration 





Xi= value of exports of commodity i to the rest of the 
world, and 
Xo= total value of all exports to the rest of the world. 
As a rule, the degree of trade concentration in developed 
countries reflects more diversification. In developing 
countries, foreign trade is concentrated in a few goods 
directed toward a few countries. The more a country's 
trade is concentrated in a few commodities or in a few 
countries, the higher is the value of coefficient. At the 
limit, when a country exports only one commodity, the 
value of coefficient becomes exactly 100. The coefficient 
of commodity concentration of imports, Cm, can be defined 
by the same formula, with Mi as the value of imports of 
g 
commodity i and Mo as the value of total imports? 
Table 3.7 shows the coefficient of commodity concen¬ 
tration of Taiwan's foreign trade in period 1952-80. The 
decreased concentration of exports happened at the same 
time when the share of industrial export increased in 1952. 
But, after 1967, the coefficient went up again. In term of 
figures, it seems that exports were concentrated in a few 
goods again. In fact, it was different from the situation 
in 1950s, when export trading was composed of mainly rice 
8 
I-Shuan Sun, " Trade Policies and Economic Develop¬ 
ment in Taiwan," in Economic Interdependence in Southeast 
Asia, ed., Morgan and Spoelstra( Madision: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1969)» p.104. 
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TABLE 3.7 
COEFFICIENTS OF CONCENTRATION PATTERNS, 1952-1980 
(percent) 
Period 
Commodity Concentration Geographic Concentration 
Cx Cm Gx Gm 
1 952 73.66 70.28 n.a. n.a. 
1 953 79.50 71.03 53.09 52.28 
1 954 77.98 74.92 55.94 58.08 
1 955 68.41 77.00 62.16 57.79 
1 956 69.22 76.58 47.41 56.81 
1 957 74.32 75.68 46.79 54.41 
1 958 68.11 75.30 49.36 55.63 
1 959 62.46 72.39 48.48 55.24 
1 960 65.50 70.28 46.20 53.50 
1 961 62.08 69.50 43.91 52.76 
1 962 64.07 72.67 42.68 52.86 
19Ü 62.71 75.48 44.22 53.96 
1 964 61 .95 75.37 43.80 51 .01 
1 965 59.98 72.02 44.48 53.46 
1 966 63.70 71 . 97 43.94 51 .81 
1 967 67.56 71.04 41 .89 52.66 
1 968 72.26 70.94 44.61 50.86 
TW9 7ÏÏ^J 70.14 46.1 9 52.49 
1 970 80.1 0 70.78 46.68 51 .35 
1 971 82.05 70.75 48.28 52.45 
1 972 84.1 6 70.66 48.33 49.39 
1 973 85.30 71.96 46.1 9 48.55 
1 974 85.31 69.88 4-4» 84 43.88 
1 975 84.48 70. 00 43.55 44. 86 
1 976 88.05 71 .21 45.40 44.15 
1 977 87.95 71.66 46.40 43.08 
1 978 89.53 73.13 46.83 44.12 
1 979 90.75 75.73 43.63 42.80 
1 980 91 .04 74.79 43.56 41 .1 7 
Cx,Cm= Coefficient of commodity concentration of exports 
and imports respectively; 
Gx,Gm= Coefficient of geographic concentration of exports 
and imports respectively. 
In 1 952, Cx=1 00((0.221 )p + (0.698)p + (0.081 )p)f = 73.66, and 
Cm=100((0.142) +(0.659) +(0.199) )2=70.28(also 
refer to Table 3.5 and 3.6). 
Source: The figures are calculated on the basis of statistics 
provided in ROC. CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book( 
Taipei, 1982), p.186,187,197-200. 
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and sugar that amounted to over 75 percent of total exports. 
Now, industrial exports has been diversified by the success¬ 
ful development of export-substituting industries 'in chemical 
fertilizer, sheet glass, pharmaceutical and petroleum products, 
plastics, transportation equipment, communication equipment, 
rubber manufactures, aluminum and its products, machinery, 
iron and steel, household and other electrical appliance. In 
other words, the export share of standardized goods has been 
reduced and that of differentiated products has been in¬ 
creased . 
On the other hand, the coefficient of commodity concen¬ 
tration of imports, Cm, maintained more stability through¬ 
out the period. The development policy gave rise to increas¬ 
ing imports of raw materials and capital goods, but also the 
government control over allocation of foreign exchange im¬ 
posed restrictions on import trading. 
(2). Geographic Concentration 
The coefficient of geographic concentration for 
Taiwan’s trade can similarly be defined by the same formula 
as that of commodity concentration. The more evenly exports 
are distributed among many trading countries, the lower the 
coefficient. If all exports destined to one conutry, the 
value will be 100? Geographically, Taiwan trades with more 
9Ibid., p.107. 
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than 100 countries. In Table 3.7, the value of the coeffi¬ 
cient, Gx, also shows Taiwan's exports has been diversified 
since post-war period. But, over the period 1952-80 the geo¬ 
graphic concentration of exports only showed a slight drop, 
in spite of the fact that the composition of exports has been 
changed from mainly agricultural or processed agricultural 
products to industrial products. The coefficient Gx reached 
a peak in 1955 and trough in 1967, then remained fairly 
stable, except for some years in the early 1970s. This was 
to some extent caused by the traditional market preference 
and the structure of economy has not as yet been further 
developed. Because in the early 1950s Japan bought so much 
of Taiwan's sugar and rice, with nearly half of total exports, 
and then, Taiwan's industries primarily emphasized on labor- 
intensiveness, which largely exported to U.S.. 
For imports, the geographic concentration of imports 
involved a gradual change over same period. The coefficient 
Gm decreased gradually from 58 percent in 1953 to 41 percent 
in 1980, reflecting an degree of concentration of imports 
from Japan and the United States has been diversified, 
which accounted for more than half of total imports each 
year. 
C. The Market Orientation of Trade 
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( 1 ). The Source of Imports 
Unlike the composition of imports, which was chiefly- 
determined by the requirements of economic development and 
industrialization, the source of imports was also influenced 
by competiveness among the suppliers, cost of transportation, 
conditions of loans and grants. The share of Taiwan's imports 
from developed countries has decreased, as shown in Table 3.8, 
but its importance has not reduced. The portion represented 
71 percent of total imports in 1979, down from 81 percent in 
1970, 86 percent in 1960, and 79 percent in 1952. Conversely, 
the share of developing countries increased considerably to 
29 percent in 1979, up from 18 percent in 1970, 13 percent in 
1960, and 20 percent in 1952. 
A further breakdown by groups of countries shows 
that Japan has been the largest supplier of capital goods 
to Taiwan during the postwar. Her share in Taiwan's total 
imports was 30 percent in 1952, 35 percent in 1960, 42 per¬ 
cent in 1970 and 33 percent in 1979. This was because geo¬ 
graphic proximity of the two countries and traditionsl mar¬ 
ket partiality for Japanese products. The United States' 
position, supplying industrial goods, food and raw materials, 
is second, dropping drastically from a higher 38 percent in 
1952 to only 23 percent in 1979. Taiwan's import from Middle 
East, mainly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, is mainly crude oil. 
TABLE 3.8 
SHARE OF TAIWAN'S FOREIGN TRADE BY COUNTRY ' GROUP 
(percent) 
Country Group 1 952 
1 960 1 970 1 979 
Im Ex Im Ex Im Ex Im Ex 
Developed Countries 85.12 62.61 86.67 56.1 8 81 .23 70.32 71 .11 69.25 
E. E.C. 8.16 4.84 8.35 5.82 8.32 9.79 9.69 12.75 
United States 38.67 4.18 38.11 11.50 23.87 39.30 22.90 35.1 0 
Japan 30.63 45.55 35.33 37.67 42.83 15.10 30.90 13.96 
Others 7.66 8. 04 4.88 1 .19 6.30 5.93 7.62 7.44 
Developing Countries 14.88 37.39 13.33 43.82 18.77 29.68 28.89 30.75 
Middle East -- ■ 4.67 0.95 3.15 0.59 13.67 3.79 
Other Asia 6.38 1 0.23 3.85 22.1 6 9.89 20.00 9.72 16.45 
Africa -- -- -- -- -- 1 .05 0.01 0.75 
Others 8.50 27.16 4.81 20.71 5.73 8.04 5.49 9.76 
Source: ROC. Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of Budge, Accounting and 
Statistic, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, Taipei, various issues. 
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Owing to the increasing cost of energy, its share rose no¬ 
ticeably from 0.7 percent in 1 958 to 13 percent in 1 979. 
Compared to trade relationship with developed coun¬ 
tries, imports from other Asia(mostly ECAFE countries, ex¬ 
cluding Japan) remained a small fraction. The share of im¬ 
ports with this area fluctuated between 3 and 9 percent of 
total imports from 1952 to 1979. Since Taiwan has industri¬ 
alized more rapidly than many of these countries, the trade 
pattern with this region was composed primarily of raw ma¬ 
terials . 
(2). The Direction of Exports 
Table 3.8 also gives an overall picture of the 
direction of exports by country and group. The direction of 
exports has two respects. The developed countries offer a 
larger market for the island’s exports than developing coun¬ 
tries do. Together the exports to Japan and the United States 
amounted to over half of Taiwan’s total exports. Additionally, 
the composition of exports to developing and developed coun- 
o 
tries appear to have a dual trend.. That is the exports to 
developed region comprised labor-intensive manufactures as 
well as certain agricultural and processed agricultural pro- 
g 
Ching-Yuang Lin, Industrialization in Taiwan, 1946- 
1972(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p.133. 
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ducts, while the exports to developing region were more ca¬ 
pital-intensive goods and manufactures. 
The industrial goods exported to developed countries, 
expecially the United States, rose fast since the rising 
cost of labor created comparative advantage to the island. 
Thus, the proportion of these area in total exports of Tai¬ 
wan increased from 62 percent in 1952 to 70 percent in 1979. 
In 1950s, the principal importer of Taiwan's goods was Japan. 
It purchased about 50 percent of Taiwanese exports. By 1960, 
due to acceleration of industrialization and Japan's pro¬ 
tectionist policies related to agricultural products and 
light-manufactures, the United States has become a much more 
important market. In 1979» it accounted for 35 percent of 
Taiwan's exports, while Japan's percentage declined from 46 
percent to 14 percent between 1952-79. European countries' 
share was usually small. These EEC countries purchased only 
4 percent of exports in 1952, and 12 percent in 1979. 
United States' gains appeared to have been made at the 
expense of not only Japan, but also developing countries. 
The decline of these region as an importer of Taiwan's manu¬ 
factures was smaller, from about 37 percent in 1952 to 30 
percent in 1979. Trade of manufactures between Taiwan and 
developing countries is based on the fact that the country 
excels other developing countries in industrial development. 
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Finally, from the above observations some findings 
are impressions. First, the growth in Taiwan's trade since 
postwar has been spectacular, which brought about an improved 
balance of payments and a sharp increase in foreign exchange 
reserve and capital inflow. Second, the rapid expansion of 
exports has augmented the availability of imports needed for 
economic development. Third, Taiwan's external trade requires 
further diversification for obtaining a more faster growth. 
Because, its exports has only rested heavily on labor-inten¬ 
sive manufactures. In addition, Taiwan is also heavily de¬ 
pendent on United States and Japanese market for outlets for 
about half of its exports. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE RELATION OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
As noted earlier, the rapid expansion of foreign trade 
has contributed importantly to economic growth in Taiwan. In 
probing into this relation, some observations are made in 
the following part to indentify the effects of trade on eco¬ 
nomic growth. 
4.1 Trade in Relation to Gross Domestic Product 
From 1952 to 1980, total trade increased from US$ 303 
million to US$ 30,876 million. Over the same period, the 
change in structure of the economy had a tremendous effect 
on the ratio of trade to total product. Table 4.1 shows the 
distribution on gross domestic product of Taiwan within 1 952- 
80. More interesting is the change in structure of GDP that 
occured over the three-decade period, particularly in the 
shares of private consumption, exports, and imports. Gener¬ 
ally, the share of government consumption fell and gross 
capital formation increased steadily after 1960. The small 
portion of increase in stock almost remained unchanged through 
time. The most striking change was the declining share of 
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TABLE 4.1 

















of Goods & 
Services 
Private Government 
1952-54 1 00 74.6 16.8 12.1 3.1 7.7 14.3 
1955-57 1 00 70.7 1 9.6 12.6 2.5 9.0 14.4 
1958-60 1 00 68.8 20. 0 16.2 2.5 11 .3 18.8 
1961-63 1 00 66.5 1 9.2 15.6 3.0 15.0 1 9.3 
1964-66 1 00 62.4 17.3 16. 9 4.0 1 9.8 20.4 
1 967-69 1 00 59.0 18.0 21.6 3.2 24-0 25.8 
1970-72 1 00 54.0 17.1 23.0 2.9 35.5 32.5 
1973-75 1 00 53.9 14.9 28.4 4.8 43.2 45.2 
1 976-78 1 00 50.9 15.2 26.6 2.6 49.9 45.2 
1 979-80 1 00 50.5 15.5 30.0 4.3 53.8 54.1 
Source: Calculated from Roc. Council of Economic Planning and Development, 
Taiwan Statistical Data Book(Taipei, 1982), p.36. 
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private consumption and the rapid rise in the share of ex¬ 
ports and imports. In 1952-54» the share of private consump¬ 
tion was about three and a half times as large as that of 
total trade. By 1979-80, the shares in three categories were 
almost equal respectively. Although, there were some years 
of economic recession in the 1970s, the ratio of exports and 
importsto total product has increased at impressive rate 
since 1 960. The ratio of exports and imports constituted 
only 8 percent and 14 percent, respectively, of total GDP 
in 1952-54» but, 15 percent and 19 percent in 1961-63, 35 
percent and 32 percent in 1970-72, and 53 percent and 54 
percent in 1979-80. The ratios of exports and imports to 
total product have nearly quadrupled between the early 1950s 
and the late 1970s. 
Table 4*1 also gives us a picture of the trend of 
economic development in Taiwan. In the 1950s, an import- 
substitution period, the growth of economy was dependent on 
the domestic market. But, in 1960s and 1970s, a primary 
export-oriented period, the major sources of economic growth 
was shifted to international markets. This is illustrated 
by the change in the structure of total product. In 1950s, 
the domestic sector(private and government) accounted for 
90 percent of total GDP, while trade sector (exports and im¬ 
ports) only 20 percent. The share of foreign trade rose from 
around 40 percent in the 1960s to 85 percent in the 1970s, 
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whereas the share of domestic consumption dropped from 90 
percent to 65 percent over the same time. 
4.2 Effects of Trade on Economic Growth 
From the point of view of the contribution of trade 
to the growth of economy, the incremental ratio of trade to 
GDP is great interest. The typical GDP is the sum of con¬ 
sumption expenditure (private and government), gross fixed 
capital formation, increase in stock, and exports of goods 
and services, but less imports of goods and services. It 
can be expressed by equation: 
Y= C+G + I + S+E-M (1 ) 
where Y= gross domestic product 
C= private consumption 
G= government consumption 
1= gross fixed capital formation 
S= increase in stock 
E= exports of goods and services 
M= imports of goods and services 
Taking the absolute variation of Y, we can rewrite the 
equation in the form: 
dY=dC+dG+dI+dS+dE-dM (2) 




dÇ.dG.dl dS.dE dM 
Y-1 Y-., Y-,| 
+ Y-1 Y~1 ~ Y-1 
dÇ ^ , dG GIu dl K , dS ^ , dE E11 dM ^ 
C^Y-.] G^Y-j I--JÏ--] S-1Y“1 E“1Y“1 M‘1Y"1 
T I ■ /0\dYdCdG , . , In equation (3), 77- , TT- , 77— , ... respectively represent 
i~1 o-1 U-, 
C- G- M- 
the growth rate of each sector, and ~1 > ’ •••» j~^ imply 
the ratio of each sector to GDP. Then, the multiplier is the 
1 
contribution of each sector to growth of GDP. The following 
example is to show how much contribution of private consump¬ 
tion expenditure(PCE) to the growth of GDP in 1952. Growth 
rate of PCE in 1 952 was 0.1 6, and the ratio of PCE to GDP 
was 0.732. Then, the contribution of PCE to GDP was 0.732 x 
0.16= 0.1171. Thus, the source of growth of GDP in 1952 was 
97.6 percent(0.1171/0.12) came from private consumption ex¬ 
penditure . 
Table 4*2 indicates the sources of growth of gross 
domestic product for period 1952-80. The calculations are 
based on the absolute amount of change in a period in order 
to measure the absolute contribution of each sector to total 
product, as by the equation (3). In the early period, the 
major source contributed to GDP growth was private con¬ 




Mou-Huan Hsing, "The General Review of Economic Growth 
Taiwan," in Collection of Economic Essay of Taiwan's Economy, 
Ming-Jen Lu(Taipei, 1970), p.134-135. • 9 
TABLE 4.2 
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*The ratio of error in these two period are extremely high, which may be statistical due to 
the high inflation in these years. 
Source: Based on the data of ROC. CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book(Taipei, 1982), p.37-38. 
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growth followed different effects before and after 1960. 
Prior to 1960, the share of exports and imports as a source 
of GDP growth was slight. After 1960, however, the situation 
was reversed. The contribution of exports and imports to 
GDP growth was 32 percent and 22 percent respectively in 
1961-63, then increased rapidly to 88 percent and 60 percent 
in 1970-72, but dropped to 52 percent for exports and rose 
to 80 percent for imports in 1979-80 due to another economic 
recession. It is impressive to note that after the 1960s, 
foreign trade was decisive factor in swift economic growth 
and in the 1970s, its importance still overweighed the do¬ 
mestic consumption expenditure even in the years of world 
economic crises. It is evident that the contribution of trade 
is great element in the growth of Taiwan's economy. 
4.3 Effects of Trade on Employment 
Foreign trade contributes to economic development in 
various ways. The leading sector of exports in the growth 
process has also brought a rapid rise of employment in Tai¬ 
wan. Based on export-oriented strategy, exports of non-durable 
consumer goods utilized the educated manpower of the country, 
while import substitution in intermediate products, machinery, 
and consumer durables would have required substantial amount 
of capital. In this connection, total employment increased 
at average annual rate of 4.3 percent in 1961-70 and 4.6 
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TABLE 4.3 
GROWTH RATES OF EMPLOYMENT, 1953-1980 
(percent) 
Period Growth Rate 
1953-60 1 .7 
1 961-70 4.3 
1 971-80 4.6 
Source : Calculated in the data of ROC. 
Statistical Data Book(Taipei, 
CEPD, Taiwan 
1982), p.8-9. 
percent in 1971-80 relative to only 1.7 percent in 1953-60 
(see Table 4.3). 
Table 4.4 is a more detailed presentation of labor 
utilization by export businesses. The exports were re¬ 
sponsible for roughly 12 percent of total employment in 
1961, with 4.9 percent in agricultural exports, 3.6 per¬ 
cent in manufacturing exports, and 3.4 percent in services. 
With the acceleration of industrialization, export busi¬ 
nesses utilized 34 percent of total employment in 1976, 
with 5.3 percent in agricultural exports, 18.2 percent in 
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TABLE 4.4 
ALLOCATION OF LABOR UTILIZATION, 1961-1976 
(percent) 
Year Labor Used Labor Used Labor Used 





Industry Demand Demand Exports 
1 961 
Agriculture 47.3 42.4 4.9 
Manufacturing 13.3 9.7 3.6 
Services 39.4 36.0 3.4 
Whole Economy 1 00.0 88.1 11.9 
1 966 
Agriculture 44.0 35. 9 8.1 
Manufacturing 15.7 9.3 6.4 
Services 40.3 34.4 5.9 
Whole Economy 1 00.0 79.6 20.4 
1 971 
Agriculture 35.7 29.3 6.4 
Manufacturing 22.7 1 0.7 12.0 
Services 41 .6 34.2 7.4 
Whole Economy 100. 0 74.2 25.8 
1 976 
Agriculture 29.6 24.3 5.3 
Manufacturing 28.1 9.9 18.2 
Services 42.3 31 .8 1 0.5 
Whole Economy 1 00. 0 66.0 34.0 
Source:Kuo, Ranis, and Fei, The Taiwan Success Story: 
Rapid Growth with Improved Distribution in the Republic of 
China, 1 952-1 979(Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1981), p.130. 
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manufacturing exports, and 10.5 percent in services. This 
indicates that the maintance of labor utilization in Taiwan 
depends greatly on export expansion. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Lessons from The Past 
From the above discussion, this case study found that 
exports have been a leading stimulus to Taiwan's industrial 
zation. Exports were the primary source of economic growth 
after the 1960s. For the economy as a whole, they widened 
the market providing more production opportunities for manu 
facturing industries and earned foreign exchange necessary 
for importing materials and equipment needed for future de¬ 
velopment. 
Taiwan's experience demonstrates that the advantage 
of pursuing economic development along lines accordant with 
one's comparative advantage. The experience in Taiwan can 
be view as a series of progressive adjustment in the use of 
its comparative advantages. First, it employed its natural 
resoures to develop agriculture and food processing indus¬ 
tries. Then, the economy was gradually shifted to develop 
labor-intensive industries. Taiwan had the availability of 
an industrious, well-motivated labor force with a high edu¬ 
cational level and relatively low wages. Now, the govern- 
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merit's strategy is to promote technology-intensive indus¬ 
tries. This is made possible by the abundance of college 
and high school graduates due to the continual attention 
paid to education by the government over the past years. 
Another reason that made the island's development 
sucessful was the attitude of its government, which gave 
economic development the highest priority. Unlike many 
less developed countries, Taiwan has had an unusually stable 
and orderly society throughout the past decades. This has 
made the country an attractive place to invest. But strong 
government is not enough. Many countries have strong govern¬ 
ments but very poor economic performance. For Taiwan, the 
government has taken a very sensible and practicable ap¬ 
proach to its industrialization. Through its policies, the 
government has also served as custodian of private firms, 
founder of new enterprises, supplier of raw materials for 
finished goods, and money lender. All of which are usually 
undertaken by far-sighted entrepreneurs or banks in most 
developed countries. In Taiwan, without the government, it 
would have been very difficult for these enterprises to 
exist and grow within the private sector. Therefore, the 
government's assistance and promotion are generally consi¬ 
dered to have been fundamental in Taiwan's successful deve- 
1opment. 
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Prospects for The Future 
For Taiwan the future development is undoubtedly in 
industrialization based on foreign trade. Over the past 30 
years, the island's swift economic growth has been made po¬ 
ssible by the availability of cheap energy, abundant reserves 
of low-cost labor and rapid expansion of external trade. 
But, the country is now bereft of the first two benefits 
and the third is in doubt in the 1980s. Since, the unskilled 
labor has been virtually fully utilized, wage rates have ■ 
been going up and the price of oil will continue to be high. 
In addition, the current threats to the island are the in¬ 
creasing competition from some other and now lower wage-cost 
countries and protectionism growing in the world market. 
To pursue future development, Taiwan will need to in¬ 
crease the range and quality of the consumer goods it makes 
and exports. These should not be in the most capital-inten¬ 
sive sector, but preferably, in low energy intensiveness, 
as well as high skill-labor or technology intensiveness, 
high value added, high marketability, and high domestic 
linkage. On the whole, these products should be relatively 
labor-intensive and relative-economical in power use. This 
is also recognized by the government. Among the manufactur¬ 
ing industries, upgraded textiles, machinery, transporta¬ 
tion equipment, electrical machinery, electronic and infor- 
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mation, should and will be given priority in development. 
To promote these strategic industries, a good invest¬ 
ment climate needs to be created and the condition for pro¬ 
fitable investments should be nurtured. Hence, a number of 
related laws, regulations, and tariff systems should be re¬ 
vised, and other measures, such as increasing banking and 
financial services, should be taken. These are the prerequi¬ 
sites for future economic growth and development. Although 
the pace of industrialization in the coming decade may be 
slower than that achieved in the past two decades, economic 
growth is expected to be able to continue. Whether future 
development will be carried out smoothly depends largely on 
Taiwan's ability to overcome these internal and external 
challenges and to remain competitive. 
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